Claims about ‘the meaning of life’ have tended to be made and discussed in conjunction with bold metaphysical and theological affirmations. For life to have meaning, there must be a comprehensive divine plan to give it meaning, or there must be an intelligible cosmic process with a ‘telos’ that a man needs to know if his life is to be meaningfully orientated. Or, it is thought to be a condition of the meaningfulness of life, that values should be ultimately ‘conserved’ (...) in some way, that no evil should be unredeemable and irrational. And it may be claimed that if death were to end our experience, meaninglessness would triumph. (shrink)

This is the first of two articles attempting a literary assessment of Valerius Flaccus' Argonautica. It will examine the poem from the beginning to 3. 474, and its successor will cover from 4. 58 to the end. Thus, there will be no overlap with matter already printed in my article, ‘The Hylas Episode in Valerius Flaccus' Argonautica’, and instances of the poet's application in other sections of the same literary principles as in the Hylas story may now be dealt with (...) summarily. The episodes are treated in order of importance rather than of occurrence, with the emphasis at present on broad outlines rather than linguistic or metrical minutiae. Even within these limitations, this assessment does not aim at exhaustiveness. Where a section of the Argonautica is unremarkable and throws little light on Valerius' poetic method, pro re pauca loquar. (shrink)

In this first paperback edition, a new introduction by Tom Burke establishes the ongoing importance of Sleeper's analysis of the integrity of Dewey's work and ...

Introduction.--Epicurus.--The cynics.--The stoics: Epictetus.--The stoics: Marcus Aurelius.--A philosophic missionary: Dion Chrysostom.--Plutarch.--A popular preacher: Maximus Tyrius.--A theosophist: Apollonius of Tyana.--The sophists: Polemon and Herodes Atticus.--A prince of neurotics: Aelius Aristodes.--Lucian.--Epilogue.

Discrimination of forms defined solely by color and discrimination of hue are dissociated in cerebral achromatopsia. Both must be based on potentially explicit information derived from differentially color-sensitive photoreceptors, yet only one gives rise to phenomenal experience of color. By analogy, visual information may be used to form explicit representations for action without giving rise to any phenomenal experience other than that of making the action.